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Bargaining and the Value of Money 
By Guillaume Rocheteau and  Christopher Waller 
 
Search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on Nash (1950) bargaining or 
strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome to determine the terms of trade.  By considering 
alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a simple search model with divisible money, 
we show how this choice matters for important results such as the ability of the optimal monetary 
policy to generate an efficient allocation. We show that the quantities traded in bilateral 
matches are always inefficiently low under the Nash (1950) and Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solutions, 
whereas under strongly monotonic solutions such as the egalitarian solution (Luce and 
Raiffa, 1957; Kalai, 1977), the Friedman Rule achieves the first best allocation. We evaluate 
quantitatively the welfare cost of inflation under the different bargaining solutions, and we 
extend the model to allow for endogenous market composition. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Bargaining theory is a cornerstone of the search-theoretic paradigm of decentralized markets (e.g.,
Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990). The usual approach to determine terms of trade in bilateral
matches is to impose the generalized Nash solution, or to use a strategic bargaining game that
yields a similar outcome. This paradigm has been applied to monetary economies by Shi (1995)
and Trejos and Wright (1995).1 By investigating alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a
search model of money we will show that the choice of the Nash solution is far from innocuous in
models of monetary economies and that important results, such as the (in)eﬃciency of monetary
equilibrium, hinge on this choice.
For example, a key result in Lagos and Wright (2005) — hereafter denoted LW — is that the
Friedman rule cannot replicate the ﬁrst best allocation and the quantity of goods traded is in-
eﬃciently low unless buyers have all the bargaining power. This too-little-trade ineﬃciency has
been attributed to a holdup problem in the bargaining which suggests that it is a robust feature of
models with bargaining. However, at the Friedman rule there is no sunk cost of acquiring money
— agents can sell a unit of money in the next period for more goods than they gave up to acquire
it and this exactly compensates them for discounting. Since this too-little-trade ineﬃciency is not
generated by a holdup problem, it seems important to check whether it has something to do with
the particular bargaining solution used in LW .
Given the concerns on how the bargaining solution may aﬀect the eﬃciency of the intensive
margin (the quantity traded in a match), one may also wonder how the bargaining solution aﬀects
the eﬃciency of the extensive margin (the number of matches). For example, some models have
shown that deviations from the Friedman rule could be optimal when the composition of trades
is endogenous (Shi, 1997). The basic idea is that inﬂation aﬀects not only agents’ choice of real
balances but also their participation decisions. In some cases, the positive eﬀects of inﬂation on
the extensive margin outweigh the negative eﬀects on the intensive margin. Although intuitive,
this result is diﬃcult to establish analytically and it seems to be present only for a small set
of parameter values (Rauch, 2000). Also, the trade-oﬀ between intensive and extensive margins
1Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) use alternating oﬀer bargaining games and show the equivalence with the
Nash solution. Coles and Wright (1998) have shown that this equivalence breaks down when one looks at dynamic
equilibria. While many papers in the literature use the dictatorial solution where buyers have all the bargaining
power, Rupert et al. (2001) have investigated the generalized Nash solution. One exception is Diamond (1984) who
uses the egalitarian solution. Also, other papers have relied on alternative pricing mechanisms such as price posting,
e.g.,Curtis and Wright (2004) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
2depends on whether the intensive margin is eﬃcient at the Friedman rule. Again, exploring how
alternative bargaining solutions aﬀect the extensive margin appears to be needed.
The objective of this paper is precisely to examine how alternative axiomatic bargaining so-
lutions aﬀect the intensive and extensive margins in a monetary search model. We demonstrate
that the source of the too-little trade ineﬃciency in LW is the lack of monotonicity of the Nash
solution, i.e., the fact that the Nash solution does not require agents’ payoﬀs to be monotonic as
the bargaining set expands. Since the monotonicity of the buyers’ surplus matters for his choice
of real balances, we carry out our analysis by comparing the Nash solution to two other standard
axiomatic bargaining solutions based on notions of monotonicity – the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975)
solution based on individual monotonicity and the egalitarian solution (Kalai, 1977) based on strong
monotonicity.2
We show that, at the Friedman rule, the quantity traded is always ineﬃciently low under the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution whereas under the egalitarian solution the Friedman Rule achieves the
ﬁrst best. We generalize these results by considering asymmetric bargaining solutions and show
more generally that monetary equilibrium is eﬃcient at the Friedman Rule under any strongly
monotonic bargaining solution. With regards to the extensive margin, we are able to establish
a simple condition under which a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal when terms of
trade are determined according to a strongly monotonic bargaining solution. Finally, we also
investigate some quantitative implications of alternative symmetric bargaining solutions. We show
that the bargaining solutions matter greatly for the welfare costs of small inﬂa t i o n( s a y2 % ) ;b u t ,
for substantial inﬂation rates (10%), the welfare costs of inﬂation are of similar magnitude across
bargaining solutions.
Before proceeding, we want to justify the use of axiomatic bargaining solutions versus non-
cooperative bargaining games in models of monetary exchange. The axiomatic approach of bar-
gaining games consists in imposing properties that one thinks are desirable for a solution to a
bargaining problem (e.g., Pareto optimality, individual rationality, monotonicity...) and then inves-
tigating the solution, or the class of solutions, that satisfy these properties. For our purpose, the
axiomatic approach has the advantage of focusing directly on the properties of the solutions that
matter for the (in)eﬃciency of monetary equilibrium. While one may want to have the explicit
2For surveys on axiomatic bargaining solutions, see Roth (1979), Peters (1992) and Thomson (1994). The diﬀerent
notions of monotonicity (strong, weak and individual) for bargaining solutions and their importance for economic
applications are discussed in Chun and Thomson (1988).
3protocol of the game that generates a particular solution in order to guarantee that this protocol is
not in conﬂict with the frictions that make monetary exchange essential, such as the lack of com-
mitment, it is in general diﬃcult to dismiss a trading mechanism that satisﬁes agents’ individual
rationality constraints.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. In Section 3 we deﬁne
the bargaining problem in a match and the axiomatic bargaining solutions we consider. Section 4
contains the characterization of steady-state monetary equilibria and results regarding eﬃciency.
Section 5 generalizes the results by considering a larger class of bargaining solutions. Section 6
investigates how the bargaining solution matters for the eﬀects of inﬂation on the extensive margin.
Finally, in Section 7 we explore some quantitative implications of alternative bargaining solutions
for the welfare cost of inﬂation. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The model
The basic environment is similar to the one in LW. Time is discrete and continues forever. Each
period is divided into two subperiods, called day and night where diﬀerent activities take place.
There is a continuum of agents with measure one who are specialized in terms of the goods they
produce and consume during the day, but all agents produce and consume the same good at night.
During the day, trading is decentralized and agents are matched bilaterally. Each agent meets
someone who produces a good he wishes to consume with probability σ ≤ 1/2 and meets someone
who likes the good he produces with the same probability σ. For simplicity, we rule-out double
coincidence of wants meetings. In section 6, we will assume that agents choose to be buyers or
sellers in the decentralized market in order to endogenize market composition (See Rocheteau and
Wright, 2004, 2005). At night there is a centralized Walrasian market where agents can trade goods
and money. All goods are nonstorable and perishable.
Agents’ preferences are represented by the following utility function:
U(qb,qs,x,y)=u(qb) − c(qs)+U(x) − y, (1)
where qb and qs are the quantities consumed and produced during the day, and x and y are the
quantities produced and consumed at night. We assume U0(x) > 0, U00(x) < 0, u0(q) > 0, u00(q) < 0,
u(0) = c(0) = c0(0) = 0, c0(q) > 0, c00(q) > 0,a n dc(¯ q)=u(¯ q) for some ¯ q>0.L e tq∗ denote the
3The mechanism design approach of monetary exchange consi d e r sa sa d m i s s i b l ea l lt r a d i n gm e c h a n i s m st h a ts a t i s f y
agents’ individual rationality constraints (Kocherlakota, 1998; Wallace, 2001).
4solution to u0(q∗)=c0(q∗) and x∗ the solution to U0(x∗)=1 ; q∗ ∈ (0, ¯ q) exists by the previous
assumptions, and we assume such an x∗ > 0 also exists. All agents have the same discount factor
β ≡ (1 + r)−1 ∈ (0,1).
Agents trade anonymously; hence, they cannot get credit in the decentralized market because
they could default without fear of punishment. Let the quantity of ﬁat money per capita at the
beginning of period t be Mt > 0 and assume Mt+1 = γMt,w h e r eγ ≡ 1+π is constant and new
money is injected by lump-sum transfers. The price of goods in terms of money in the centralized
market is pt. In the following, we will omit time indices and will replace t +1by +1, t +2by +2
and so on.
We restrict our attention to steady state equilibria where the real value of aggregate money bal-
ances M/p is constant. This implies p+1 = γp. Bellman’s equation for an agent in the decentralized
market holding z = m/p units of real balances is
V (z)=σ
Z
{u[q(z,˜ z)] + W [z − d(z,˜ z)]}dF(˜ z)
+σ
Z
{−c[q(˜ z,z)] + W [z + d(˜ z,z)]}dF(˜ z)+( 1− 2σ)W(z), (2)
where F(˜ z) is the distribution of real balances across agents, and W(z) is the value function of the
agent in the centralized market. Equation (2) has the following interpretation. An agent meets
someone who produces a good he likes with probability σ.H e c o n s u m e s q units of goods and
delivers d units of real balances to his trading partner where q and d depend on his real balances z
and the real balances ˜ z of his partner in the match. With probability σ, the agent meets someone
who likes his good. He is then the seller in the match. With probability 1 − 2σ,n ot r a d et a k e s
place. In the centralized market the problem of the agent is
W(z)=m a x
ˆ z,x,y
{U(x) − y + βV(ˆ z)} (3)
s.t. x + γˆ z = y + z + T, (4)
where T the lump-sum transfer (expressed in general goods), and ˆ z the real balances taken into the
next day.4 In the budget identity (4), we have used the fact that the relative price of real balances
next period in terms of the general good is p+1/p = γ. Substituting y from (4) into (3) we obtain5
W(z)=m a x
ˆ z,x
{U(x) − x − (γˆ z − T − z)+βV(ˆ z)}. (5)
4Note that ˆ m/p =( p+1/p)(ˆ m/p+1)=γˆ z.
5We do not impose nonnegativity on y, but it is easy to choose fundamentals in order to guarantee that y ≥ 0 in
equilibrium.
5From (5), x = x∗ and the maximizing choice of ˆ z is independent of z;a n dW is linear in z with





−iˆ z + σ
Z
{u[q(ˆ z,˜ z)] − d(ˆ z,˜ z)}dF(˜ z)+σ
Z
{d(˜ z,ˆ z) − c[q(˜ z,ˆ z)]}dF(˜ z)
¾
(6)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h a t1+i =( 1+π)(1 + r) where i is the nominal interest rate.6 According
to (6), agents choose their real balances in order to maximize their expected surplus in the search
market minus the opportunity cost of carrying real balances.
3 Bargaining
In this section, we describe the bargaining problem in a match between a buyer holding z units of
real balances and a seller holding ˜ z units of real balances and we apply three standard bargaining
solutions — the Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky and egalitarian solutions — to this problem.7
3.1 The bargaining problem
An agreement is a pair (q,d) where q is the amount of goods produced by the seller and d is the
amount of real money transferred by the buyer to the seller. The monetary transfer is constrained
by the real balances of the buyer and the seller, i.e., −˜ z ≤ d ≤ z. The utility of the buyer if an
agreement is reached is ub = u(q)+W(z−d) whereas the utility of the seller is us = −c(q)+W(˜ z+d).
If no agreement is reached, the utility of the buyer is ub
0 = W(z) and the utility of the seller
is us
0 = W(˜ z).W h i l e ub
0 and us
0 are taken as given within the bargaining problem, they are
endogenously determined in the equilibrium of the economy.
From the linearity of W(z), ub = ub
0+u(q)−d and us = us
0+d−c(q). Assume the buyer commits




(u(q) − d + ub
0,d− c(q)+us
0) : d ∈ [−˜ z,τ] and q ≥ 0
o
In Figure 1, we represent the bargaining game S(τ) for three values of τ,i . e .τ3 >τ 2 >τ 1.N o t e
that S(τ) ⊂ S(τ0) for all τ<τ 0. (See the Appendix for details.) In the following, we will assume
6One could introduce bonds in the model and let agents trade these bonds in the centralized market but not take
them into the decentralized market. The nominal interest rate would then be given by the Fisher equation in the
text.
7These axiomatic bargaining solutions are reviewed in details in Roth (1979) and Thomson (1994).
6that money holdings are common knowledge in a match, and agents cannot commit not to spend
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Figure 1: The bargaining set
Formally, a bargaining game is a pair (S,u 0) where S is the set of feasible utility levels and
u0 =( ub
0,u s
0) is the disagreement outcome. A solution to the bargaining problem is a function µ
that assigns a pair of utility levels to every bargaining game.
3.2 The Nash solution
The Nash (1950) solution, µN, is the unique solution that satisﬁes the axioms of Pareto optimality,
scale invariance, symmetry and independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is given by





Since ub − ub
0 = u(q) − d and us − us




subject to d ≤ z.T h es o l u t i o ni sq = q∗ and d =[ u(q∗)+c(q∗)]/2 if z ≥ z∗ ≡ [u(q∗)+c(q∗)]/2,
and d = z and




otherwise. Note that u(q) − z(q)=Θ(q)[u(q) − c(q)] where Θ(q)=u0(q)/[u0(q)+c0(q)].I ti se a s y
to show that u(q)−z(q) is non-monotonic in q a n dn e g a t i v e l ys l o p e di nt h ev i c i n i t yo fq = q∗. This
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Figure 2: Nash solution.
3.3 The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution preserves all the axioms of the Nash solution except the indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives that is replaced by the axiom of individual monotonicity.8 Consider
two bargaining problems (S1,u 0) and (S2,u 0) such that S1 ⊂ S2 where the range of utility levels
attainable by j is the same in S1 and S2. Individual monotonicity implies that the utility of player
i 6= j is higher in the second bargaining problem. In words, an expansion of the bargaining set S
in a direction favorable to agent i always beneﬁts i. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, µK,s a t i s ﬁes
µK(S,u 0)=u0 + λK (ˆ u − u0) (9)
where λK is maximum value of λ such that u0 + λ(ˆ u − u0) ∈ S,a n dw h e r eˆ u =
¡
ˆ ub, ˆ us¢
≥ u0






ˆ us − us
0
ˆ ub − ub
0
. (10)
The best alternative of the buyer in S is ˆ ub such that ˆ ub = ub
0 +m a x q,d[u(q) − d] subject to















0 + u(q∗) − c(q∗) if z ≥ u(q∗),
us





8As for the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution has strategic foundations. See Moulin (1984) and Peters
(1992, ch 9).












, if z ∈ [c(q∗),z∗], (12)
where z∗ ∈ [c(q∗),u(q∗)] is the value of z that satisﬁes (12) when q = q∗.I fz ∈ [z∗,u(q∗)], (q,d)







For all z ∈ [0,z∗], (11)-(12) deﬁne an implicit relationship between q and z,i . e .z = z(q).D e s p i t e
the axiom of individual monotonicity it can be checked that for our bargaining problem the buyer’s




b b u u 1 2 < ) , ( 0 0
s b u u
s u1 ˆ
s u2 ˆ
b b u u 2 1 ˆ ˆ =
Figure 3: Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
3.4 The egalitarian solution
The egalitarian solution (Luce and Raiﬀa, 1957; Kalai, 1977) imposes a stronger notion of monotonic-
ity, the strong monotonicity, according to which no players are made worse-oﬀ if additional alterna-
tives are made available to the players. Consider two bargaining problems (S1,u 0) and (S2,u 0) such
that S1 ⊆ S2. Then, a solution µ is strongly monotonic iﬀ µ(S1) ≤ µ(S2). Kalai (1977) showed
that the unique solution that satisﬁes Pareto optimality, symmetry and strong monotonicity is the
9egalitarian solution.9 In our context, the egalitarian solution implies
ub − ub
0 = us − us
0. (14)
From (14), (q,d) satisﬁes −c(q)+d = u(q) − d and d = z if q<q ∗.T h e r e f o r e , q = q∗ and
d =[ u(q∗)+c(q∗)]/2 if z ≥ z∗ ≡ [u(q∗)+c(q∗)]/2,a n dd = z with





Interestingly, this bargaining solution is invariant under decomposition of the bargaining process
into stages (Kalai, 1977). As an illustration, suppose the buyer has z units of money. Agents could
ﬁrst bargain over the quantity to produce in exchange for τ1 units of money, and in a second step
they would bargain over the quantity to produce in exchange for the z−τ1 units that are left. The
status quo point in the second step would be the utility that players would reach if they would
agree in the ﬁrst step. Under the egalitarian solution, this procedure by steps is equivalent to a
one-time bargaining (See Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Proportional solution.
9In contrast to the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, the egalitarian solution is not scale invariant — it is
invariant only under simultaneous rescaling of the utility functions of the two players with the same rescaling factor.
Therefore, it allows for interpersonal comparisons of utility. See the discussions in Kalai (1977) and Kalai and Samet
(1985). Also, if the set of feasible utilities S is not strongly comprehensive the axiom of Pareto optimality has to
be weakened or, alternatively, one can use the lexicographic egalitarian solution to maintain Pareto optimality. See
Peters (1992) and Thomson (1994).
104 Equilibrium and eﬃciency
In the following, we derive results regarding the existence and eﬃciency of monetary equilibrium
for a class of bargaining solutions that encompasses the three solutions described in the previous
section. We restrict the deﬁnition of a bargaining game to a statu-quo point u0 and a set ¯ S ⊆ S of
pair of utility levels that are feasible and individually rational, i.e., ub ≥ ub
0 and us ≥ us
0.
Lemma 1 Any solution to the bargaining problem
¡ ¯ S,u 0
¢
described in Section 3 that satisﬁes the
axiom of Pareto eﬃciency is such that: (i) Terms of trade (q,d) are independent of the seller’s
real balances; (ii) There exists a threshold z∗ for the buyer’s real balances such that q = q∗ for all
z ≥ z∗.
The ﬁrst part of Lemma 1 indicates that the terms of trade only dependent of the buyer’s real
balances. Obviously, this result hinges on the linearity of agents’ payoﬀs.10 The second part of
Lemma 1 indicates that the socially eﬃcient trade is predicted by all bargaining solutions provided
that the buyer’s real balances are large enough. The following assumption imposes additional
requirements to the bargaining solution in order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium.
Assumption 1 For all z ≤ z∗ = z(q∗), d = z and q is implicitly deﬁned by z = z(q) where z(·)
is a continuous function; For all z>z ∗, q = q∗ and d is a non-decreasing function of z.
Conditions in Assumption 1 are satisﬁed for the three bargaining solutions presented in Section
3.11 The requirement that d is non-decreasing in z when z>z ∗ will be used to show that the agent’s
choice of real balances is not greater than z∗. The continuity of the function z(·) will guarantee
the existence of a solution to the agent’s choice of real balances, and therefore the existence of
monetary equilibrium. The function z(q) is given by (29) for the Nash solution, by (11)-(13) for
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and by (15) for the egalitarian solution.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, the agent’s problem (6) can be reformulated as
max
q∈[0,q∗]
{−iz(q)+σ[u(q) − z(q)]} (16)
10This condition would not hold if the trading mechanism is such that the bargaining solution in a match is
contingent on the match type. For instance, one could use the generalized Nash solution in all matches but assume
that the buyer’s bargaining power depends on the seller’s real balances. Also, this condition would not hold in a
model with non-degenerate distribution of money balances since the seller’s marginal value of money would depend
on his real balances.
11As shown in Rocheteau and Waller (2005), these properties are satisﬁed for other bargaining solutions such as
the asymmetric versions of the Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky and egalitarian solutions.
11The maximization problem in (16) has a simple interpretation. The agent chooses the quantity
q to trade in the decentralized market in order to maximize his expected surplus as a buyer minus
the cost of holding the real balances that are necessary to buy q. If (16) has more than one solution,
we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria where all agents choose the same real balances.12
Deﬁnition 1 A steady-state monetary equilibrium is a q>0 solution to (16).
Proposition 1 If u(q∗) − z(q∗) > 0 then there exists an ¯ ı>0 such that an equilibrium exists for
all i<¯ ı.
The previous Proposition established that an equilibrium exists provided the cost of holding
real balances is not too large.13 We now investigate some implications of the choice of the bar-
gaining solution for the eﬃciency of monetary equilibrium. The following Proposition is a direct
consequence of Lemma 2.
Proposition 2 (i) There exists an equilibrium with q = q∗ at i =0iﬀ q∗ is a maximizer of
u(q)−z(q) over [0,q∗].( i i )I fu(q)−z(q) is (strictly) increasing over [0,q∗) then q = q∗ is an (the)
equilibrium at i =0 . (iii) Assuming z(q) is diﬀerentiable, if u0(q∗) <z 0(q∗) then q = q∗ is not an
equilibrium for any i ≥ 0.
Proposition 2 uses the following key observation. At i =0there is no holdup problem because
there is no sunk cost associated with acquiring money. So any ineﬃciencies at i =0are not the
result of a holdup problem. Whether or not a buyer’s choice of real balances generates a socially
eﬃcient trade depends on how the buyer’s surplus from a trade varies with real balances, and
how it co-varies with the total surplus of a match. According to (i), the equilibrium is eﬃcient
if the buyer’s surplus u(q) − z(q) is maximum when the buyer’s asks for the eﬃcient quantity q∗.
According to (ii), this condition is satisﬁed if the bargaining solution is such that the buyer’s payoﬀ
is increasing in q for q in [0,q∗] As a consequence, the Friedman rule achieves the ﬁrst-best allocation
for any strongly monotonic bargaining solution. In contrast, if the solution is non-monotonic, and
if the buyer’s surplus decreases when q gets close to q∗, then the Friedman rule fails to achieve the
eﬃcient allocation.
12There would be no conceptual diﬃculty in considering asymmetric equilibria. More generally, an equilibrium is
al i s t(qi), one for each agent, where each qi is a solution to (16).
13For some speciﬁcations, the threshold ¯ ı in Proposition 1 is in fact inﬁnite.
12However, for i>0 there is a sunk cost — even though an agent can dispose of his money in
the following centralized market, the value of money does not increase at the time rate of discount.
Thus, the holdup problem is not eliminated by any of our bargaining solutions — rather it is the
Friedman rule that eliminates it.
Corollary 1 For all i ≥ 0, equilibria under the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are ineﬃ-
cient, q<q ∗. Equilibria under the egalitarian solution are eﬃcient iﬀ i =0 .
As noticed in LW, the quantity traded under Nash bargaining is ineﬃciently low even at the
Friedman Rule (i =0 ). The reason for the ineﬃciently low q comes from the fact that the Nash
solution is non-monotonic and the buyer’s surplus u(q) − z(q) reaches a maximum at q<q ∗.A
similar ineﬃciency occurs under Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining. The reason is as follows. Whenever
z>c (q∗), an increase in the buyer’s real balances leaves the buyer’s maximum surplus unaﬀected,
ˆ ub−ub
0 = u(q∗)−c(q∗), whereas the maximum surplus of the seller increases (assuming z<u (q∗)).
As a consequence, the seller’s share of the match surplus increases. When q is close to q∗ this
implies that the buyer’s surplus falls.
Under the egalitarian solution, the Friedman rule achieves the ﬁrst best allocation. This is a
consequence of the strong monotonicity axiom of the egalitarian solution. Since the buyer’s surplus
increases with his money holdings, and strictly increases if z<z ∗, the buyer will invest up to z∗
when i =0 . To put it diﬀerently, the buyer’s surplus u(q) − z(q) is half of the total surplus of the
match, u(q) − c(q). It is therefore maximized when the surplus of a match is maximized.
5 More on bargaining solutions
In this section, we give additional examples of bargaining solutions that are strongly monotonic
and we show how the results of Section 4 can be generalized to asymmetric bargaining solutions.
5.1 Monotonic solutions
Thomson and Myerson (1980) have characterized the class of bargaining solutions, named the
monotone path solutions, that satisfy Pareto optimality and strong monotonicity. Consider a nor-
malized bargaining game where u0 =( 0 ,0). Given a strictly monotone path P in R2
+,t h a ti sa
strictly increasing function from R+ into R+, the monotone path solution relative to P chooses the
maximal point of S along P. The egalitarian solution is the monotone path solution relative to
13the 45o-line. From Proposition 2, the equilibrium at the Friedman rule is eﬃcient under monotone
path solutions.
One method to choose a monotone path in the context of a gradual bargaining problem, that is
a family of bargaining problems, has been proposed by Wiener and Winter (1998) and O’Neill et al.
(2004). This is the so-called gradual Nash (or ordinal) solution. The idea, related to the negotiation
by steps of Kalai (1977), is to envision the bargaining as a sequence of small steps where in each
step agents would use the Nash solution and would take as the status quo point the outcome of the
previous step. (Despite this description, remember that this solution is axiomatic and not based
on a strategic game.) In our context, one can think of the bargaining as a sequence of negotiations,
one for each unit of money that the buyer holds. The gradual Nash solution corresponds then to a





where H(ub,u s,τ)=0is the equation of the Pareto frontier of S(τ). According to (17), at each
point of the agreement path, the ratio of the buyer and the seller marginal utility gains is the rate of
substitution of their utility on the current eﬃcient frontier.14 The determination of the bargaining









Figure 5: Gradual Nash solution
14This solution has several interesting properties. First, if one interprets the bargaining as a bargaining in diﬀerent
stages, the solution used in each stage that would be consistent with gradual Nash could be the Nash solution, the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or any solution that is scale invariant. Second, the solution is ordinal in the sense of
being covariant with monotonic transformations of each player’s utility.
14The gradual Nash solution applied to our problem implies that the change in the buyer’s surplus
along the bargaining path is d(ub − ub
0)/dq = Θ(q)[u0(q) − c0(q)] where Θ(q)=
u0(q)
u0(q)+c0(q) (See the
Appendix). So gradual Nash is essentially applying the Nash solution at the margin. The expression







Since u0(q) − z0(q) > 0, Proposition 2 implies that q = q∗ at i =0 .
5.2 Asymmetric solutions
The class of solutions that satisfy Pareto eﬃciency, scale invariance and independence of irrelevant
alternatives are the so-called generalized Nash solutions. In our context, the generalized Nash
solution satisﬁes
(q,d) = argmax[u(q) − d]
θ [−c(q)+d]
1−θ





Unless θ =1 , the quantity traded is always too low at i =0 .I f θ =1 , the buyer can extract
the entire surplus of the match and the Friedman rule is optimal. The same logic applies to the
asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
The generalization of the egalitarian solution is the proportional solution studied by Kalai
(1977). In our context, proportional solutions satisfy (1 − θ)[u(q) − d]=θ[−c(q)+d].I fθ =1 /2
the proportional solution is the egalitarian one. Then,
z(q)=( 1− θ)u(q)+θc(q). (20)
Thus, the buyer’s surplus is u(q) − z(q)=θ[u(q) − c(q)] and, from Proposition 2, q = q∗ iﬀ i =0
for any θ>0.
Finally, the asymmetric gradual Nash solution (See Wiener and Winter, 1998) obeys
u0(q) − z0(q)=Θ(q)[u0(q) − c0(q)]







Since u0(q) − z0(q) > 0 for all q<q ∗, q = q∗ at the Friedman rule for any θ>0.
156E x t e n s i v e m a r g i n e ﬀects
As shown by Shi (1997), search models of money can be extended to endogenize the frequency
of trades. We examine the eﬀect of inﬂation on the extensive margin under strongly monotonic
bargaining solutions. As discussed before, the strong monotonicity property is appealing and it
avoids problems related to agents’ incentives to hide money. Also, unlike the Nash or Kalai-
Smorodinsky solutions, strongly monotonic solutions yield simple analytical conditions as to when
the composition of buyers and sellers, and therefore the number of trades, is eﬃcient.
Following Rocheteau and Wright (2004), we extend the model of Section 2 to let each agent
choose to be either a buyer or a seller in the decentralized market. Let n be the fraction of sellers.15
Following Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), the matching probabilities of buyers and sellers are σb = n
and σs =1 −n, respectively. Substituting V (z) by its expression given by (2) into (5), and using the
fact that buyers do not produce in the decentralized market, the value of a buyer in the centralized
market with z units of real balances satisﬁes
Wb(z)=U(x∗) − x∗ + z +m a x
q∈[0,q∗]
{−(γ − β)z(q)+βn[u(q) − z(q)]} + βWb(0). (22)
Similarly, the value of being a seller with z units of real balances is given by
Ws(z)=U(x∗) − x∗ + z + β {(1 − n)[z(q) − c(q)] + Ws(0)}. (23)
Since both Wb(z) and Ws(z) are linear in z, the choice of being a buyer or a seller is independent
of z. In any active equilibrium, agents must be indiﬀerent between being a seller or a buyer.
Consequently, Wb(z)=Ws(z) and, from (22) and (23), n satisﬁes
(1 − n)[z(q) − c(q)] = n[u(q) − z(q)] − iz(q). (24)
The left hand-side of (24) is the seller’s expected surplus in the decentralized market whereas the
right hand-side is the buyer’s expected surplus minus the cost of holding real balances. Solving for
n we get
n =
(1 + i)z(q) − c(q)
u(q) − c(q)
. (25)
From (22), q solves
max
q∈[0,q∗]
{−iz(q)+n[u(q) − z(q)]}. (26)
15Instead of assuming that agents can choose their types, one can follow Rocheteau and Wright (2004) and assume
that agents need to specialize in a production technology. Either they produce an intermediate good traded in the
decentralized market (in which case they are sellers) or they engage in home production that requires to use the
intermediate good traded in the decentralized market (in which case they are buyers).
16Deﬁnition 2 A steady-state monetary equilibrium is a pair (q,n) such that q is solution to (26)
and n satisﬁes (25).
Assumption 2 u(q) − z(q) is maximum at q = q∗ and u00(q∗) − z00(q∗) < 0.
Strongly monotonic bargaining solutions, such as the egalitarian or the gradual Nash solutions,
satisfy the requirements in Assumption 2. Since q = q∗ at i =0 ,t h ee ﬀects of a change in i in the













Inﬂation has a direct eﬀect by raising the cost of holding real balances. Therefore, buyers reduce
their real balances and q falls. Also, n tends to increase.
Welfare is measured by the sum of the instantaneous utilities of buyers and sellers, i.e., W =
n(1−n)[u(q)−c(q)]. It is maximized for q = q∗ and n =0 .5. In the following Proposition, we give
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a deviation from the Friedman rule to raise W.




Proposition 3 provides an intuitive condition under which the Friedman Rule is suboptimal. If
the buyer’s share in the total surplus of a match at q = q∗ is more than a half then there are too
many buyers in the market. In this case, a social planner would be willing to trade oﬀ eﬃciency on
the intensive margin to improve the extensive margin by raising the number of sellers. Note that
u(q∗)−z(q∗)
u(q∗)−c(q∗) =1 /2 is the Hosios (1990) condition for eﬃciency in search models.16
The following Corollary reformulates Proposition 3 in the case where terms of trade in bilateral
matches are determined according to an egalitarian bargaining solution that assigns a fraction
θ ∈ (0,1) of the surplus to buyers — See (20) — or according to the gradual Nash solution where θ
is the buyer’s bargaining power — See (21).
16The argument according to which a deviation from the Friedman rule could be optimal when the Hosios (1990)
condition is violated has been spelled out by Berentsen, Rocheteau and Shi (2001) for a particular bargaining protocol.
Also, despite some similarities, our results are in sharp contrast with those of Shi (1997) where an increase in the
money growth rate raises the number of buyers. Therefore, a deviation from the Friedman rule in Shi’s model is
welfare improving when the number of buyers is too low.
17Corollary 2 (i) Under egalitarian bargaining, a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal when-
ever θ>0.5. (ii) Under gradual Nash bargaining, a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal
whenever θ>¯ θ where ¯ θ<0.5.
If θ>0.5 then inﬂation is welfare-improving under both egalitarian and gradual Nash solutions.
How does this compare to the Nash solution? To make the comparison, we need to specify functional
forms and parameterize them. If we let u(q)=q0.7/0.7 and c(q)=q, we ﬁnd that the threshold
¯ θ for the gradual Nash solution above which inﬂation is welfare-improving is approximately 1/3
while under the Nash solution, a deviation is optimal for θ>2/3. Therefore, the Friedman rule is
more likely to be optimal under the Nash solution than under the gradual Nash solution. This is
so because under Nash bargaining the Friedman rule fails to achieve the eﬃcient q which makes a
deviation from the Friedman rule more costly.
7 Quantitative implications
The result derived in Corollary 1, namely, under monotonic bargaining solutions the Friedman
rule generates the eﬃcient q, has important implications for the welfare eﬀects of inﬂation. In this
section we quantify the welfare costs of inﬂation under the bargaining solutions presented in Section
3 as well as the gradual Nash solution.
Our quantitative experiments follow the methodology in LW, which is based on Lucas (2000).
We calibrate the model in order to match money demand in the data. We set a period to a year
and β−1 =1 .03. The functional forms are U(x)=Alnx so that x∗ = A, u(q)=q1−a/(1 − a) and
c(q)=q.F i n a l l y ,w es e tσ =0 .5.W ec h o o s e(a,A) to match the money demand data as deﬁned
by L = M/PY = L(i) where P is the nominal price level and Y real output. We measure i by the
short term commercial paper rate, Y by GDP, P by the GDP deﬂator, and M by M1,a si nL u c a s .
We consider the period 1900-2000.
In the model L is constructed as follows. Nominal output in the decentralized market is 0.5M.
Nominal output in the centralized market is px∗. Hence, PY =0 .5M + px∗. Using the fact that





We measure the welfare cost of a π percent inﬂation by asking how much buyers’ total con-
sumption should be reduced to in order to have the same welfare at i =( 1+π)/β − 1 and i =0 .
18Expected utility for an agent given i is measured by Wi. Suppose we reduce i to 0 but also reduce
buyer’s consumption of all goods by a factor ∆. Expected utility becomes
W0(∆)=σ[u(q0∆) − c(q0)] + U(x∗∆) − x∗,
where qi is the equilibrium values for q given i. The welfare cost of inﬂation is the value of ∆ that
solves W0(∆)=Wi(1). In the following, we let ¯ ∆ = 100(1 − ∆) ;i . e . ¯ ∆ is the percentage they
would give up to have the Friedman Rule instead of i.
We ﬁrst calibrate the model assuming Nash bargaining. We ﬁnd (a,A)=( 0 .297,1.91). Keeping
(a,A) unchanged we vary the bargaining solutions in order to evaluate the welfare cost associated
with diﬀerent values for i. The labels N, K, E and G indicate the Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky,
egalitarian and gradual Nash solutions, respectively.



















































Table 1. Welfare cost of inﬂation under alternative bargaining solutions.
The key insight of this quantitative exercise is that the welfare cost of small deviations from
the Friedman rule is much bigger for the non-monotonic bargaining solutions than the monotonic
ones. For instance, for i =0 .03 the welfare costs under Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky are more than
double those for the egalitarian and gradual Nash solutions. Interestingly, for large deviations, the
welfare costs are very similar. For i =0 .13, the ﬁrst three solutions are nearly identical while the
gradual Nash is about one percentage point lower. Nevertheless, the magnitudes are very large
compared to the estimates of Lucas (2000). This reﬂects the fact that a holdup problem exists for
all symmetric bargaining solutions and the ineﬃciency associated with it is exacerbated as inﬂation
increases.
In the following table, we recalibrate (a,A) for each bargaining solution and we compute the
19welfare cost associated with i =0 .13.
a A ∆0.03 ∆0.05 ∆0.08 ∆0.13
N 0.297 1.91 0.85 1.52 2.49 3.83
K 0.298 1.90 0.86 1.54 2.51 3.85
E 0.292 2.41 0.34 0.81 1.67 3.14
G 0.271 2.21 0.34 0.77 1.48 2.56
Table 2. Welfare cost of inﬂation under alternative bargaining solutions.
The welfare cost of inﬂation is almost identical under Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining
solutions. The smallest welfare cost of inﬂation is obtained under gradual Nash bargaining. Nev-
ertheless, the estimates are not that much diﬀerent than in Table 1.
The lesson we take away from this quantitative exercise is the following. For small deviations
from the Friedman rule, the bargaining solution that is used matters for measuring the welfare
cost of inﬂation. This is due to the monotonicity properties of the bargaining solution near the
Friedman rule. However, for large deviations, all of our symmetric bargaining solutions give similar
numbers which show that the welfare costs of inﬂation are quite large.
8C o n c l u s i o n
Bargaining has become an integral part of monetary search models. Yet very little work has
been done to understand how various bargaining solutions aﬀect the qualitative and quantitative
predictions of the models. In this paper we examined a series of bargaining solutions to do just
that. Our qualitative analysis provides insight as to how non-monotonic payoﬀs in some bargaining
solutions aﬀected the equilibrium of the model in important ways. By studying bargaining solutions
other than the Nash solution, we were able to separate eﬀects due to holdup problems from those
occurring because of the non-monotonicity of payoﬀs. This had not been done before and, as a
result, it was not well understood why the Friedman rule could not replicate the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n .
On the quantitative side, we showed that monotonic bargaining solutions are associated with
lower welfare costs of inﬂation near the Friedman rule than non-monotonic bargaining solutions.
However, the costs are very similar for inﬂation rates suﬃciently far away from it. We also showed
how alternative bargaining solutions aﬀect the extensive margin of trading and that deviations from
the Friedman rule may be optimal over a wide range of parameter values.
20Appendix
A1. Pareto-frontier of S. The equation for the Pareto frontier of S is derived from the
program ub =m a x q,d[u(q) − d]+ub
0 s.t. −c(q)+d ≥ us − us




u(q∗) − c(q∗) − (ub − ub
0) if us − us








Therefore, d2us/(dub)2 =0if us ≤ z − c(q∗) and d2us/(dub)2 < 0 otherwise.
A2. Proof of Lemma 1. (i) With no loss, we can normalize the utility functions to assign zero
utility to the two players in case no agreement is reached, u0 =( 0 ,0).T h es e t¯ S of incentive-feasible
utility levels is then
¯ S = {(u(q) − d,d − c(q)) : c(q) ≤ d ≤ u(q), d ≤ z and q ∈ [0,q∗]}.
Since
¡ ¯ S,u 0
¢
is independent of ˜ z, the outcome of the bargaining, (q,d), is independent of the seller’s
real balances.(ii) If z ≥ u(q∗) then any Pareto eﬃcient outcome is such that q = q∗.
A3. Proof of Lemma 2. From Lemma 1, we can omit the dependence of (q,d) on sellers’
real balances and (6) yields
max
ˆ z
{−iˆ z + σ {u[q(ˆ z)] − d(ˆ z)}}.
Furthermore, q(z)=q∗ and d(z) ≥ d(z∗) for all z ≥ z∗. Therefore, z ≤ z∗ for all i>0. Finally,
since z = z(q) for all z ≤ z∗, it is equivalent to express the agent’s problem as a choice of q.
A4. Proof of Proposition 1. The function −iz(q)+σ[u(q) − z(q)] is continuous and
maximized over the compact set [0,q∗], so a solution exists. At i =0 , the solution to (16)
is strictly positive since maxq∈[0,q∗] {σ[u(q) − z(q)]} ≥ σ [u(q∗) − z(q∗)] > 0.F r o m t h e T h e o -
rem of the Maximum, maxq∈[0,q∗] {−iz(q)+σ [u(q) − z(q)]} varies continuously with i.D e n o t e
¯ ı = {i :m a x q∈[0,q∗] {−iz(q)+σ[u(q) − z(q)]}} > 0.T h e n¯ ı>0 and for all i<¯ ı there exists a q>0
solution to (16).
A5. Proof of Corollary 1. From Proposition 2, it is suﬃcient to show that u0(q∗) <z 0(q∗) for
the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. For the Nash solution, z0(q∗)=u0(q∗)−Θ0(q∗)[u(q∗)−








u0(q)ˆ us + c0(q)ˆ ub , if z ∈ [c(q∗),z∗].
Therefore, z0(q∗)=u0(q∗)
¡
ˆ us +ˆ ub¢
/
£




>u 0(q∗).C o n s i d e r







From (29), q = q∗ iﬀ i =0 .
21A6. Gradual Nash bargaining solution. To apply the gradual Nash solution to our prob-
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If τ ≥ us−us
0+c(q∗) then q = q∗ so that an increase in τ does not allow for mutual gains. Therefore,
dus/dτ = dub/dτ =0 .I fτ<u s − us






Diﬀerentiating ub = u(q) − τ + ub
0 and us = τ − c(q)+us






for all q<q ∗. (32)
Integrating (32), and use the fact that q =0at z =0 , one obtains (18).
A7. Proof of Proposition 3. Since q = q∗ at i =0 ,t h ew e l f a r ee ﬀect of a deviation from






[u(q∗) − c(q∗)](1 − 2n∗)
= z(q∗)(1 − 2n∗).
From (25), n∗ =
z(q∗)−c(q)
u(q)−c(q) . Therefore, dW
di > 0 iﬀ
z(q∗)−c(q∗)




A8. Proof of Corollary 2. Under egalitarian bargaining,
u(q∗)−z(q∗)






0 Θ(q)[u0(q) − c0(q)]dq
u(q∗) − c(q∗)
,
where Θ(q)=θu0(q)/[θu0(q)+( 1− θ)c0(q)] >θfor all q<q ∗.T h e r e f o r e ,
u(q∗)−z(q∗)
u(q∗)−c(q∗) >θ .L e t¯ θ be
the value of θ such that
u(q∗)−z(q∗)
u(q∗)−c(q∗) =1 /2. Then, ¯ θ<0.5.
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